Privatization and efficiency: differentiating ownership effects from political, organizational, and dynamic effects
By Belén Villalonga. 2000
353 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1bef6bb047d561a80d6bab8f7a4f5db4f4f4d6b8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Walid Saffar
- Narjess Boubakri
- J. Cosset
- Stacy L. Eller
- C. Kirkpatrick
- David W. Parker
- Yin-Fang Zhang
- Peter R. Hartley
In Economics and Econometrics
- Stacy L. Eller
- C. Kirkpatrick
- Narjess Boubakri
- J. Cosset
- David W. Parker
- Yin-Fang Zhang
- Peter R. Hartley
- K. Medlock
Citations in the corpus
- The Performance Differential between Private and State Owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership, Management and Market Structure (2008, background): “Managers will seek to improve the competitiveness and performance of their firm, at least if they have incentives that are based on performance (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000; Villalonga, 2000).”
- Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Does Regulation Make a Difference? (2004, background): “More important is the introduction of effective competition and organizational or political changes (for recent reviews of the literature, see Martin and Parker, 1997; Villalonga, 2000; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Kikeri and Nellis, 2001).”
- State ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies (2013, neutral): “The belief in public ownership inefficiency is underlined by the property rights perspective in economics (Martin and Parker, 1997; Villalonga, 2000) and the residual claimant theory (Rowthorn and Chang, 1993).”
- Political connections of newly privatized firms (2008, background): “Our conjecture is echoed by arguments in Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) that the replacement of preprivatization managers is called for in order to allow internal changes in the governance of NPFs.”
- Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency: The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants (2005, neutral): “1”
- Does ownership matter? The performance and efficiency of State Oil vs. Private Oil (1987-2006) (2009, neutral): “…of the performance and efficiency impact of all available privatisations since 1977.6 Regarding the previous literature of cross-sectional analyses, Villalonga (2000) provides a concise summary of both original and review studies.7 Whilst a convincing majority of studies find evidence in favour of…”
- Empirical evidence on the operational efficiency of National Oil Companies (2011, background): “2 Villalonga (2000) provides a thorough discussion of theoretical and empirical studies of the efficiency”
- Explaining the Variance in the Performance Effects of Privatization (2000, background): “A metareview (Villalonga, 2000) of the 153 studies included in the above reviews shows that although a simple count of results would give a considerable edge to private ownership (there are 104 studies in favor, 14 against, and 35 neutral), the cumulative evidence is not conclusive.”
- Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation (2008, background): “…lower prices and higher productive efficiency (Bouin and Michalet, 1991) and that the success or failure of the privatisation of monopolies depends on the post-privatisation regulatory framework, which in turn is affected by political and social norms (Levy and Spiller, 1996; Villalonga, 2000).”