How bad is selfish routing?

By Tim Roughgarden, É. Tardos. Proceedings 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2000

2,034 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1bb850d2cd2515b7f69a145c809e33ca39f6dc81

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Citations in the corpus

Stackelberg scheduling strategies (2001, methodology): “In previous work by the author and Eva Tardos [27] (motivated by a paper of Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [19]) it is shown that in general the Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily more costly than the optimal assignment, but if every machine latency function is linear then the total latency of”
Network games (2004, background): “For example, the price of anarchy in routing game of [31] for general delay functions can be very bad.”
A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2006, background): “In [124], a comment on the results of [123] was made in which it is shown that if TCP or other congestion control is used, rather than agents choosing their own transmission rates, then the Braess phenomenon is reduced considerably.”
Sprite: a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for mobile ad-hoc networks (2003, methodology): “Our approach is motivated by algorithmic mechanism design (see e.g., [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]), which is an emerging active research area in the intersection of computer science and mathematical economics.”
Trajectory based forwarding and its applications (2003, background): “ing along the shortest path is not always the best option in wired networks [7].”
Nash equilibria in competitive societies, with applications to facility location, traffic routing and auctions (2002, background): “In particular, here we sketch how a maximisation version of the selfish routing problem of Roughgarden and Tardos [9] fits into our framework.”
Game theory in communications: motivation, explanation, and application to power control (2001, background): “[1] and [2]), but we believe that it can be applied fruitfully to a much broader class of problems in communications systems.”
Self-organized routing for wireless microsensor networks (2005, background): “Against this background, our goal is to maximize not just the length of time that sensors remain active, but also the active area over which the sensor network is recording data (as motivated in Section I).”
Strategic Interaction and Networks (2010, methodology): “We exploit Monderer & Shapley(cid:146)s (1996) theory of potential games that computer scientists have used to study congestion and other issues (e.g., Roughgarden & Tardos (2002), Chien & Sinclair (2007)).”
Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games (2004, methodology): “The authors [16, 17, 18], motivated by networking issues, subsequently applied this idea to a classical model of traffic routing with noncooperative players [20] and determined the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria.”