Market Timing and Managerial Portfolio Decisions
By Dirk Jenter. 2005
502 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1b81f79b301aeeb3248e420dae066be25e7dac9e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- David A. Hirshleifer
- Malcolm P. Baker
- Paola Sapienza
- Amy K. Dittmar
- Venky Nagar
- Usman Ali
- Sarah E. McVay
- Massimo Massa
In Finance
- David A. Hirshleifer
- Malcolm P. Baker
- Amy K. Dittmar
- Usman Ali
- Paola Sapienza
- Sarah E. McVay
- Venky Nagar
- Massimo Massa
In Strategy and Management
- Amy K. Dittmar
- Malcolm P. Baker
- David A. Hirshleifer
- Vicki Wei Tang
- Usman Ali
- Brian J. Bolton
- L. Field
- Venky Nagar
Citations in the corpus
- CEO Optimism and Incentive Compensation (2014, unknown): “Both findings are consistent with the results of Jenter (2005), who uses insider trading patterns to identify divergences in top managers' perceptions of fundamental value and market valuations and finds little evidence that the use of inside information can explain the trading behavior.”
- Overvalued Equity and Financing Decisions (2012, unknown): “Previous literature (e.g., Jenter (2005)) finds that insiders are more likely to sell (buy) their firm’s shares when they perceive their stock is overvalued (undervalued).”
- Empirical Capital Structure: A Review (2009, unknown): “However, supporting the Baker and Wurgler interpretation is evidence by Jenter (2005) who finds that M/B ratios are also strong predictors of insider trading.”
- The Role of Target Leverage in Security Issues and Repurchases (2004, unknown): “Finally, following Lie (2002), we add Graham’s (1996a, 1996b) estimates”
- Opportunism as a Firm and Managerial Trait: Predicting Insider Trading Profits and Misconduct (2017, background): “Jenter (2005) argues that recent changes in the value of managers’ equity holdings induced by price run-ups or compensation grants are likely to induce uninformative insider trading for”
- Capital Market-Driven Corporate Finance (2009, background): “For example, Meulbroek (1992), Seyhun (1992), and Jenter (2005) find that managers seem to time their own trades well.”
- CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment (2005, unknown): “Consistent with Jenter (2002), high values of Q— perhaps, in this context, a proxy for market overvaluation—appear to decrease 14 The results are the same if we look only at CEOs who had an option to reach the 67% threshold at least twice.”
- Competition of the Informed: Does the Presence of Short Sellers Affect Insider Selling? (2015, background): “3 The first variable follows the literature (e.g., Scott and Xu 2004 and Jenter 2005), while we construct the second variable as the maximum selling span in a given month to capture our unique prediction regarding the speed of trading.”
- Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast (2006, background): “Consequently, recent empirical insider trading studies such as Jenter (2005) scale net purchases by managers’ holdings.”
- Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm Value (2009, unknown): “Jenter (2005) only finds limited evidence that managers outperform through their trades.”
- Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm‐Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs (2012, unknown): “Further, Insider Sale is generally decreasing with the BTM decile in all samples, consistent with Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), and Jenter (2005).”
- Decoding Inside Information (2012, unknown): “Jenter (2005) also tries to filter out non-informative insider trades by controlling for recent changes in the value of managers’ equity stakes (in order to rule out diversification or rebalancing motives), but finds no predictive power of managers’ Decoding Inside Information — Page 13 insider…”