Self Enforcing Voting in International Organizations

By Giovanni Maggi, Massimo Morelli. 2006

127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fadb5a33a7d0a8eae859d57bbc35c30b382229c4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Timothy S. Simcoe
2. Juan F. Escobar
3. Marc Rysman
4. Juuso Toikka
5. Fiona E. Murray
6. Scott Stern
7. Kenneth Guang-Lih Huang
8. Jeffrey L. Furman

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Juan F. Escobar
2. Marc Rysman
3. Juuso Toikka
4. Timothy S. Simcoe

Citations in the corpus

• Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information (2013, background): “2For economic applications, see, for example, Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) on oligopolistic competition, Levin (2003) on relational contracting, Maggi and Morelli (2006) on voting in international organizations, or Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) on repeated auctions.”
• Patents and the Performance of Voluntary Standard-Setting Organizations (2008, background): “United Nations or the World Trade Organization—where voting rules must be “self enforcing” ( Maggi and Morelli 2006 ).”