Enforcing Forward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity in GCC & LLVM

By Caroline Tice, T. Roeder, Peter Collingbourne, Stephen Checkoway, Ú. Erlingsson, Luis A. Lozano, Geoff Pike. USENIX Security Symposium, 2014

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The Art, Science, and Engineering of Fuzzing: A Survey (2018, background): “A recent project focused on protecting against a subset of CFI violations has landed in the mainstream gcc and clang compilers [208].”
Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications (2015, background): “recently described two variants of Forward-Edge CFI for the GCC and LLVM compiler suites [52] that solely aim at constraining indirect calls and jumps but not returns.”
C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (2016, background): “Many improvements have been made in the last years making CFI an efficient and effective mitigation technology [47, 43].”
Code-pointer integrity (2014, background): “Many practical CFI solutions simply include every function in a program in the set of valid targets [53, 54, 29, 47].”