Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy

By W. Clark, Mark Hallerberg. American Political Science Review, 2000

248 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1ada33c175e8369eddd85854ebd7667b95b8af45

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Citations in the corpus

Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions (2002, methodology): “The categorization of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes is from Clark and Hallerberg 2000.”
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RELATIONS (2003, background): “In countries where the stakes in elections are high, politicians might prefer floating exchange rates, so as to preserve the use of monetary policy as a tool for building support before elections (Clark & Hallerberg 2000).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “Various fiscal rules can reduce PBCs: balanced budget requirements or budget targets (Hallerberg and von Hagen 1998; Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Rose 2006; Alt and Rose 2007; Donahue and Warin 2007; Schneider 2010; Garcia-Sanchez et al. 2011; Benito et al. 2013a; Klomp and de Haan 2013c), delegation…”
Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention (2005, background): “4 Clark and Hallerberg (2000) offer an additional explanation: Given capital mobility, fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes constrain monetary policy and fiscal policy, respectively.”
ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, background): “…global-economic exposure, and exchangerate regime as key considerations, and these are central themes in later views of conditional electoral cycles (e.g., Bernhard & Leblang 1999, 2002; Franzese 1999, 2002b; Oatley 1999; Boix 2000; Clark & Hallerberg 2000; Leblang & Bernhard 2000a,b; Clark 2002).”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, unknown): “6Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996); Lohmann (1992, 1997); Jonsson (1995); Simmons (1996); Boix (1998, 2000); Clark et al. (1998); Garrett (1998); Franzese (1999, 2003); Oatley (1999); Clark and Hallerberg (2000); Way (2000); Broz and Frieden (2001); Bernhard et al. (2002); Broz (2002); Clark (2002a).”
Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World (2010, background): “Finally, focusing on developed democracies, studies such as those by Clark (2002), Clark and Hallerberg (2000), and Hallerberg (2002) examine the trade-off between fiscal and monetary policy discretion within the Mundell-Fleming framework.”
Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom (2004, methodology): “Following Clark and Hallerberg 2000, we employ an alternative measure of capital mobility that is based on the capital controls that states imposed to prevent capital from leaving the country; Simmons (1999) codes capital controls on an eight-point scale, based on information provided in the…”