Who Surfs, Who Manipulates? The Determinants of Opportunistic Election Timing and Electorally Motivated Economic Intervention

By Mark A. Kayser. American Political Science Review, 2005

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Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “It should be noted that besides these empirical studies, analytical models of the choice of election date have been proposed (see, among others, Smith 1996; Kayser 2005).”
Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders (2009, background): “…2006), impose or comply with sanctions (Marinov, 2005), promote economic development (Bates, 1981; Wintrobe, 1998; Przeworski et al., 2000; Jones & Olken, 2005), initiate political reform (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson, 1997) and the timing of elections (Warwick, 1994; Smith, 2003; Kayser, 2005).”
Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote (2011, background): “…for governments and also © 2010 The Author(s) European Journal of Political Research © 2010 European Consortium for Political Research gives governments incentives to attempt to compensate, to find ways to reduce the uncertainty, such as the opportunistic timing of elections (Kayser 2005).”