Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions

By Mark Hallerberg. International Organization, 2002

139 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88f4c72ef3827d13cf1fa47d54800b1c188cccce

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Thomas Oatley
2. J. Frieden
3. C. Bodea
4. Raymond Hicks
5. Fabrizio Gilardi
6. J. Broz
7. R. Franzese
8. Stefanie Walter

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Fabrizio Gilardi
2. R. Franzese
3. J. Frieden
4. Stefanie Walter
5. J. Broz
6. Mark Copelovitch
7. W. Clark
8. C. Bodea

Citations in the corpus

• The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions (2002, background): “See Keefer and Stasavage 2002; and Hallerberg 2002. inflation policies may survive the displeasure of a subset of political principals if at least one veto player prefers the banks’ policy to the policy that would be enacted by a government with discretionary power over monetary policy.”
• The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis (2016, background): “For example, veto player configurations (Hallerberg, 2002; Keefer & Stasavage, 2002), legislative and electoral institutions (Bernhard & Leblang, 1999), and the influence of special interests (Frieden, 2002; Steinberg, 2015; Walter, 2008) all affect the degree to which foregoing monetary policy auto”
• The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 Countries and 7 Sectors (2005, background): “5 A distinct argument is that of Hallerberg (2002), who, in the context of delegation to independence central banks, maintains that veto players matter because they influence the capacity of each player to have a decisive impact on policy.”
• Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions (2014, background): “…for delegation of monetary policy, the evidence for an association between CBI and inflation has been mixed with a particularly weak relationship in developing countries.24 The early work on the topic shows a strong negative relationship between inflation and CBI in developed countries.25…”
• The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy (2011, background): “But in all instances, it studies problems the community deems important+ Second, problem-driven research strives principally to produce useful knowledge rather than to identify law-like empirical regularities+ As Farrell and Finnemore argue, “rather than seeking necessarily to construct coherent bod”
• ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, background): “Clark & Hallerberg (2000), Hallerberg (2002), and Hallerberg et al. (2001) also find context-conditional electoral cycles in, respectively monetary policy, fiscal policy, and both.”