Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in China

By Takao Kato, Cheryl X. Long. 2006

229 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a60e252e01a5a5c30c78de9138a500c483b8e3a

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, unknown): “Thus, Kim et al. (2003) find evidence of greater conservatism for clients of larger audit firms when managers have incentives to increase their firm’s reported earnings.”
Firm Profitability, State Ownership, and Top Management Turnover at the Listed Firms in China: A Behavioral Perspective (2009, unknown): “Unlike in developed economies such as the U.S. where CEOs normally retire after stepping down 1 , serving as the CEO or board chair of a listed firm is usually not the final stage of one’s career in China.”
Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China (2014, unknown): “Existing studies on Chinese executive compensation have documented a positive correlation between executive pay and firm performance (Buck et al. 2008; Conyon and He 2011, 2012; Firth et al. 2006a, 2007; Kato and Long 2006a).”
Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “…illustrates how the government control over the appointment of senior executives (Chairmen and CEOs) of the listed SOEs affects the relation between firm performance and CEO turnover, and between firm performance and executive compensations [Kato and Long, 2006, Ke et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2013].”
The effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms (2017, background): “Data on Chinese listed firms have been widely used in high-quality 22 publications (e.g., Fisman and Wang, 2010; Kato and Long, 2006; Fernald and Rogers, 2002).”
China's R&D explosion - analyzing productivity effects across ownership types and over time (2016, unknown): “…have only a few delistings in our sample, the unbalancedness of our panel data is driven by the expansion of the stock 3 The financial information of listed Chinese firms is now sufficiently precise so that it can be used for highquality research (see, e.g., Fisman & Wang 2010, Kato & Long 2006).”
Political capital and CEO entrenchment: Evidence from CEO turnover in Chinese non-SOEs (2017, result): “It is close, however, to the 25.51% and 24% documented by Firth et al. (2002) and Kato and Long (2006), respectively, for Chinese listed firms during the period 1995 to 2001.”