Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies

By P. Joskow. 2002

212 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/199c1f5ce69683f3050d8870f86d9c7c939c9c00

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In Economics and Econometrics

M. Brauer

Citations in the corpus

The Economics of Governance (2005, unknown): “Given that the economics of governance was stimulated in part by the evolving crisis in antitrust enforcement and regulation during the 1960s, little wonder that many of the public policy applications of governance have been to antitrust (Joskow, 2002) and regulation/deregulation (Levy and Spiller, ”
What Have We Acquired and What Should We Acquire in Divestiture Research? A Review and Research Agenda (2006, background): “With respect to antitrust policy, it has been conceded that the “the knowledge base we have today to guide divestiture remedies is limited” and that “much needs to be learnt about designing effective divestiture strategies” (Joskow, 2002: 113).”
Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Research in the Social Sciences (2006, unknown): “A more sweeping conclusion is reached in Joskow (2002), who after examining the TCE implications for antitrust law pronounces that “[m]odern imperfect competition theory that fails to take TCE principles into account is likely to lead to poor legal rules and remedies.””
Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of 'Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason' (2006, unknown): “…accept the fact that both our general economic knowledge about market competition and our possibilities to achieve sufficient case-specific knowledge in order to assess the specific positive and negative welfare effects are limited (Easterbrook 1992; Joskow 2002; Heyer 2005; see section III.2).”