Refinement of Strong Stackelberg Equilibria in Security Games
By Bo An, Milind Tambe, Fernando Ordóñez, E. Shieh, Christopher Kiekintveld. 2011
65 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Given the real-world deployments of attacker-defender Stackelberg security games, robustness to deviations from expected attacker behaviors has now emerged as a critically important issue. This paper provides four key contributions in this context. First, it identifies a fundamentally problematic aspect of current algorithms for security games. It shows that there are many situations where these algorithms face multiple equilibria, and they arbitrarily select one that may hand the defender a significant disadvantage, particularly if the attacker deviates from its equilibrium strategies due to unknown constraints. Second, for important subclasses of security games, it identifies situations where we will face such multiple equilibria. Third, to address these problematic situations, it presents two equilibrium refinement algorithms that can optimize the defender's utility if the attacker deviates from equilibrium strategies. Finally, it experimentally illustrates that the refinement approach achieved significant robustness in consideration of attackers' deviation due to unknown constraints.
Subfields: Civil and Structural Engineering, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
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Citations in the corpus
- Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “…of equilibria satisfying desirable properties, e.g., admissibility (Banks & Sobel, 1987), subgame perfection (Selten, 1965), Pareto efficiency (Bernheim et al., 1987) or robustness against opponent’s deviation from best response in security-related applications (Fang et al., 2013; An et al., 2011).”
- From physical security to cybersecurity (2015, methodology): “For example, the attacker’s reward if successfully attacking a target t is known to lie within the interval [1, 3].”
- Protecting Moving Targets with Multiple Mobile Resources (2013, background): “This paper in contrast focuses on protecting mobile targets that leads to a continuous set of strategies for the players.”