Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions

By Eric Maskin, Jean Tirole. Journal of Economics Theory, 2001

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Feedback effects of credit ratings (2013, background): “These are subgame perfect equilibria in Markov strategies (Maskin and Tirole (2001)).”
The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010, background): “The competent politician will obviously choose to achieve minimum level of output that the incompetent incumbent would not be willing to target, y will be equal to the value that satisfies (73) with equality.”
Asymptotic Least Squares Estimators for Dynamic Games (2008, methodology): “Equation (26) is a necessary equilibrium condition that must be satisfied at every state s ∈ S, for every player i, and for every action ai = 1, .”
Learning-By-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics (2007, neutral): “Shapley (1953). Maskin & Tirole (2001) provide the fundamental theory showing how many subgame perfect equilibria of these games can be represented consistently and robustly as Markov perfect equilibria.”
Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence (2005, background): “…As such, I drop the round-of-play indicator ~t!+ Contingent on the level of concessions, the expected level of terror, and the aid of former terrorists, the government will play the same strategy in each round+ The maximization problem is given by: 21+ Maskin and Tirole 2001+ max a $s~a, h!”