Does credit rationing imply insufficient lending

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Determinants of capital structure in Irish SMEs (2010, background): “It is important, however, in consideration of such a policy not to advance loans in excess of socially unproductive levels (De Meza & Webb 2000).”
Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment (2005, unknown): “22 de Meza and Webb (2000) shows that advantageous selection can persist in equilibrium if moral hazard prevents lenders from raising interest rates to clear the market.”
Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies (2015, background): “Advantageous selection (de Meza and Webb 1987; 2000) and moral hazard under nonexclusive contracting (Bisin and Guaitoli 2004; Degryse, Ioannidou, and von Schedvin 2012; Bizer and DeMarzo 1992; Goldstein and Razin 2013) can both fit the bill.”
Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a need for R&D subsidies? (2010, methodology): “Following, eg de Meza and Webb (2000), we could also assume that instead of verifiable project success, only payments are verifiable and that entrepreneurs cannot hide income in case they default.”