Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory

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The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas (2009, background): “There is, therefore, asymmetric information between buyers and sellers of quota leases (considered a transaction cost by economists, along with search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs [21]), which confers market power to quota owners and to a lesser extent to the processors who b”
Is There a Market for Ideas (2010, unknown): “…by and large, have mostly developed independently of one another.1 The market design literature utilizes formal game-theoretic approaches to evaluate how the rules that govern exchange and allocation impact the efficiency of different market institutions (Roth, 2002, 2008; Myerson, 2008).”