The elephant in the room: The hidden costs of leasing individual transferable fishing quotas

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A Cautionary Note on Individual Transferable Quotas (2010, background): “Social scientists other than economists argue that whatever the potential economic benefits of ITQs, they act contrary to principles of equity and social justice in fishing communities wherever they have been tried, and therefore are not appropriate for managing certain fisheries (Davis 1996, McCay ”
Practical steps toward integrating economic, social and institutional elements in fisheries policy and management (2017, background): “Overcoming inertia to integrate social, economic and institutional objectives The literature provides a litany of criticisms of conventional fisheries management (Wiber, 2000; Hilborn, 2007; Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009; Symes & Phillipson, 2009; Charles, 2013).”
Evaluating effectiveness of time/area closures, quotas/caps, and fleet communications to reduce fisheries bycatch (2014, result): “of the programme have reported varying results (Diamond, 2004; Pinkerton and Edwards, 2009; Turris, 2010; Grimm et al., 2012).”
The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological, economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas (2012, background): “Although an expected (and to some extent sought for) impact, it has turned out to be one of the key points of debate on the opportunity and effectiveness of ITQ approaches to access regulation in fisheries (Pinkerton & Edwards, 2009).”