Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe's Fiscal Framework
By Anthony M Annett. Social Science Research Network, 2006
168 citations recorded by the source corpus.
The Stability and Growth Pact has been a success in numerous EU countries, especially in guiding them toward underlying fiscal balance ahead of population aging. These countries tend to be smaller, subject to greater macroeconomic volatility, and reliant on a form of fiscal governance that emphasizes targets and contracts. Most of the new members share these characteristics. For the countries less compatible with the Pact, domestic governance reforms that increase the reputational costs for noncompliance can be useful complements to the fiscal framework.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/161d7e09c9b8f80080959ac1aadd16e63f1cb55f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Fiscal Policy in Real Time (2012, unknown): “Annett (2006), Jonung and Larch (2004), Strauch, Hallerberg and von Hagen (2004)), these data are often affected by a “political bias” inducing an overly optimistic outlook on the state of public finances.”
- The political economy of EDP fiscal forecasts: An empirical assessment (2011, methodology): “Sources: Armingeon et al. (2006), variable coded as gov_type, until 2004.”
- The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research (2010, unknown): “For example, based on Andrew K. Rose (2000) and subsequent contributions, Richard Baldwin (2006) has recently surveyed the empirical literature on how (European) monetary unification affects the volume of international trade, while Philip R. Lane (2006) has surveyed how the EMU has affected capital ”
- Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Councils and All that: Commitment Devices, Signaling Tools or Smokescreens? (2007, unknown): “…of fiscal governance in place to alleviate common pool problems (the delegation and commitment models) have no robust impact on the average balance, which is in line with the findings of Annett (2006) for the post-1992 period, but also indicative of a potential collinearity problem between the two.”
- Planning to cheat: EU fiscal policy in real time (2009, unknown): “(2004), Annett (2006), Moulin and Wierts (2006) and Von Hagen (2008) do use data from the SCPs.”