The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs

By John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan. 2000

119 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Law, Public Administration, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/159df96f92e37f006a62ce7692af247e08fd456a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Law

1. M. Thatcher
2. J. Blom‐Hansen
3. B. Wood
4. Giovanni Capoccia
5. J. Bohte

In Public Administration

1. Giovanni Capoccia
2. M. Thatcher
3. J. Blom‐Hansen
4. B. Wood
5. J. Bohte
6. Berthold Rittberger
7. M. Lodge

In Strategy and Management

1. Giovanni Capoccia
2. M. Thatcher
3. J. Blom‐Hansen
4. B. Wood
5. J. Bohte
6. Berthold Rittberger
7. M. Lodge
8. J. Heijden

Citations in the corpus

• Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest (2005, unknown): “13 Cognizant of the problem of observational equivalence for establishing shirking in the analysis of many individual regulatory decisions (Huber and Shipan 2000), we focus on episodes in which divergent interests of the stakeholders and the agents can be well established based on original…”
• Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design (2004, methodology): “Others have also used the phrase, including Wilson (1989), Dixit (1996), Williamson (1996), and Huber and Shipan (2000).”
• Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions (2002, background): “These ideas developed in the United States during the 1980s, primarily in research on the relationship between Congress and American regulatory agencies (see Pollack, this volume).(2) We also briefly discuss relevant ideas found in ‘new-institutional’ organisational sociology.”
• The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe (2005, background): “PA analysis would expect elected politicians to engage in a cost–benefit analysis (cf. Huber and Shipan 2000).”
• When Do Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change (2016, background): “For general discussions, see Stone Sweet (2000) and Huber and Shipan (2000).”
• Principals, agents, and the implementation of EU cohesion policy (2005, background): “5 For good reviews of the principal–agent perspective, see Moe (1984); Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991: ch. 2); and Huber and Shipan (2000).”