Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions

By M. Thatcher, A. S. Sweet. 2002

642 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Public Administration, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2869287d4bfde002f97361f11e2e31f8f8c84dcf

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Citations in the corpus

The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament (2003, positive): “Non-majoritarian institutions provide solutions to collective action problems identified by functional theories of delegation (nondecision and non-compliance), because delegation enhances the credibility of promises struck between different principals (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 4).”
Regulation, the Regulatory State and European Politics (2008, neutral): “In addition, ‘delegation’ to regulatory agencies has also been interpreted as a method of shifting blame away from politicians and towards ‘defenceless’ regulators as well as regulated companies (see Thatcher and Sweet Stone 2002 ).”
Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies (2008, background): “In recent years, many public service organizations have been granted substantial autonomy (see Van Thiel 2000; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; Pollitt et al 2004).”
The European regulatory state and global public policy: micro-institutions, macro-influence (2007, background): “National governments have liberalized a range of sectors and have created new political institutions ‐ regulatory agencies, administrative courts, and ombudsmen ‐ to oversee market competition ( Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002 ).”
Regulation after delegation: independent regulatory agencies in Europe (2002, background): “They underline the danger of ‘agency losses’ as agents do not follow the preferences of their principals (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2002; cf. Pollack 2002).”
When Do Institutions “Bite”? Historical Institutionalism and the Politics of Institutional Change (2016, background): “…Waddan, 2012, pp. 29-30; Hall & Thelen, 2009, p. 19).10 In this view, “losers” of prior legislative battles may focus their efforts on courts and bureaucracies to shift the interpretation and patterns of implementation of formal rules to their advantage (e.g., Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2003, p. 17).”
Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies (2010, background): “While most of these studies focus on the role of EU agencies in the ‘post-delegation’ phase, we argue that assessing and explaining agencies' formal-institutional independence is a crucial first step to explore the potential for the level of agencies' influence in EU policy-making since the level of”