Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

By James M. Walker, R. Gardner, Andrew Herr, Elinor Ostrom. 2000

234 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services (2016, background): “exogenous rule making suggest that communities may dislike external imposition of an internal distribution rule (Ostrom, 2006; Walker et al., 2000).”
The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources (2006, background): “Other experiments have examined endogenous voting patterns under different rules (Walker et al., 2000).”
VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS (2007, unknown): “Most experimental research on public or common goods, however, has focused on individual decisions rather than voting rules.1 Walker et al. (2000) (WGHO) are an exception.”
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods (2011, background): “Walker et al. (2000) find that minimum winning coalition allocations accounted for 42% of proposals adopted under direct democracy.”