Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism

By Robert Sugden. 2008

201 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/14b53111f6ab8056e8001d886d5fe3c17a24a3aa

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Citations in the corpus

Decisional enhancement and autonomy: public attitudes towards overt and covert nudges (2013, background): “come, as well as the desire to protect autonomous decision making (Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 2012; Bovens, 2009; Hausman & Welch, 2010; Hill, 2007; Mitchell, 2004; House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee, 2011; Sugden, 2008; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; White, 2008).”
Design of Stated Preference Surveys: Is There More to Learn from Behavioral Economics? (2010, background): “The literature on paternalism has faced a lot of opposition; see, e.g., Sugden (2007, 2008).”
Putting nudges in perspective (2017, background): “Perhaps there is no ‘view from nowhere’ that adjudicates what people really want, and hence no basis for policy-makers to justify interventions as being welfare-maximising (e.g. Sugden, 2008, 2013).”
Green nudges: Do they work? Are they ethical? (2016, background): “57 This problem is only beginning to receive the attention it deserves, see, e.g., Sugden (2008), Angner (2016: ch. 12), Schubert and Cordes (2013), and Schubert (2015a).”
Implications of behavioural economics for financial literacy and public policy (2012, background): “Experts are assumed to know better than individual decision makers what is in their best interest (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008; see also Camerer et al., 2003; de Meza et al., 2008; Shefrin, 2002; Thaler, 1980, 2000; see Sugden, 2008, 2009, for a critique of Thaler and Sunstein).”
From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond (2015, background): “…preferences (namely complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities and no lack of willpower) might appear quite ill-defined, as suggested by Sugden (2008)—who argues that even if they could be clarified, it would make them presumably impossible to know for the libertarian paternalistic…”