The Link Between Earnings Timeliness, Earnings Conservatism and Board Composition: Evidence from the UK

By Wendy Beekes, P. Pope, S. Young. 2004

445 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/12ac6137fce5805f4d848b8a5653cf20c07196b7

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Citations in the corpus

Conditional conservatism and cost of capital (2011, background): “3 Consistent with this view, Beekes et al. (2004) , Ahmed and Duellman (2007), and Garci ´a Lara et al.”
Financial Crisis And Earnings Management: The European Evidence (2014, background): “The proportion of outside directors in particular was found as being positively related to earnings timeliness (Beekes et al., 2004) and negatively associated with earnings management (Peasnell et al.”
The Economic Determinants of Conditional Conservatism (2009, unknown): “…(2000), Giner and Rees (2001), Basu, Hwang and Jan (2001), Ball et al. (2003), Ryan and Zarowin (2003), Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos (2004), Beekes et al. (2004), García Lara, García Osma and Mora (2005), Huijgen and Lubberink (2005), Gassen, Fulbier and Sellhorn (2006), Bushman and…”
Accounting Conservatism and Board of Director Characteristics: an Empirical Analysis (2007, unknown): “Third, while Beekes et al. (2004) focus on examining board independence, we examine a broader set of board characteristics that reflect the strength of directors’ monitoring incentives as well as board independence.”
Evidence on the Role of Accounting Conservatism in Monitoring Managers' Investment Decisions (2011, methodology): “First, while prior research documents a positive relationship between conservatism and the strength of board governance (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2009), it does not provide evidence on the specific benefits of conservatism in monitoring firms’ investment pol”
Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, result): “Overall, our results are complimentary to prior studies that show that the presence of independent directors increase corporate transparency (e.g. Chen, Cheng and Wang, 2015; Armstrong, Core, and Guay, 2014; Beekes, Pope and Young, 2004).”
Earnings quality in ex‐post failed firms (2009, background): “We choose conditional conservatism as a benchmark to assess whether the usefulness of earnings declines in ex-post bankrupt firms as a result of both accounting and real activities manipulation for several reasons: (1) conditional conservatism is a summary measure of managerial reporting choices; (2”
Earnings management behaviors under different monitoring mechanisms: The case of Islamic and conventional banks (2016, background): “This is consistent with the assumption that Islamic banks with increased board independence recognize more LLPs, which aligns with previous literature regarding the positive impact of board independence on accounting quality (Brown et al., 2011; Beekes et al., 2004).”
The Effects of Contracting, Litigation, Regulation, and Tax Costs on Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism: Cross-Sectional Evidence at the Firm Level (2007, background): “2002), and firms monitored by more independent boards (Beekes et al. 2004).”
Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance (2008, background): “, Beekes et al. (2004) report a mean board size of 8.”