Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models

By Stephen Ansolabehere, J. Snyder. 2000

401 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/125131b5bfd55e91b911bc84af20d96bdda7b351

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Citations in the corpus

Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy (2009, background): “(1) Do voters follow the same naive intuition as legal scholars and great thinkers? No. They behave strategically.13 ( 2 ) Is the strategic reasoning too”
The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium (2007, unknown): “Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), and Aragones and Palfrey (2002, 2005).”
Competition between Specialized Candidates (2010, methodology): “When candidates are office-motivated as in our model (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) , Aragones and”
How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign (2013, unknown): “This paper is related to a vast literature on candidate’s valence, initiated by Stokes (1963) and including Enelow and Hinich (1982), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001), Schofield (2003), Aragones and Palfrey (2002) among others.”
Modeling the interaction of parties, activists and voters: Why is the political center so empty? (2005, background): “So far, however, the formal results have been limited to two-party competition (Ansolabehere & Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001).”
Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election (2009, background): “Some of these expanded models have included components such as valence dimensions, under which one candidate possesses an advantage based on personality, honesty, or some other characteristic that is valued equally by all voters (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001; Stokes 1963).”
Competing on Good Politicians (2009, background): “Groseclose (2001) shows that the party with the candidate enjoying an exogenous valence advantage will choose to be more moderate, because this advantage becomes more relevant for lower ideological differences (see also Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Aragones and Palfrey 2002). In our model, valence ”