Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions

By Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues. 2001

185 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/120a70483eb7af8cbb5976963364717a53e827e5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

1. Juan F. Escobar
2. K. Bagwell
3. Juuso Toikka
4. Susan Athey
5. Stefan Wager
6. Sylvain Chassang
7. Xinkun Nie
8. Guido W. Imbens

Citations in the corpus

• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks (2008, background): “Aoyagi (2003), Athey and Bagwell (2001), Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004) and Skryzpacz and Hopenhayn (2004) develop models of this kind, where rms play a repeated Bertrand pricing game, or equivalently, act as bidders in a series of procurement auctions.”
• Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information (2013, background): “2For economic applications, see, for example, Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) on oligopolistic competition, Levin (2003) on relational contracting, Maggi and Morelli (2006) on voting in international organizations, or Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004) on repeated auctions.”