Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance: Evidence from the Field

By John R. Graham, Michelle Hanlon, Terry Shevlin, Nemit Shroff. 2014

787 citations recorded by the source corpus.

ABSTRACT: We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 corporate tax executives to investigate firms' incentives and disincentives for tax planning. While many researchers hypothesize that reputatio...

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8a92354abe8dbbda1063e88e50a382dc42f7e713

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Citations in the corpus

Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, neutral): “Prior research in other settings suggests that executives are concerned about protecting their reputation and finds that executives seek to influence media coverage (Westphal and Deephouse 2010), and recent survey evidence suggests that tax executives at multinational firms are concerned about the r”
Tax Avoidance and Ex Ante Cost of Capital (2017, positive): “6 Survey evidence in Graham et al. (2014) provides support for the prominent role of this risk-reward tradeoff in managers’ decisions not to engage in tax avoidance: tax executives that considered but did not implement a particular tax-planning strategy selected “the transaction lacked business purp”
How does quasi-indexer ownership affect corporate tax planning? (2019, neutral): “30 valuation and performance evaluation than cash flows (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Ball and Shivakumar, 2006; Graham et al., 2014).”
Directors with foreign experience and corporate tax avoidance (2020, background): “Nevertheless, survey evidence still suggests that managers believe there is a reputational cost associated with tax avoidance (Graham et al., 2014).”
Governance and Taxes: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity (2016, positive): “Lastly, we include a measure of cash effective tax rates with operating cash flows in the denominator, rather than book income, because of recent work by Guenther et al. [2014]. They show that cash ETRs can be low either because of tax aggressiveness decreasing the numerator, or the inflation of ear”
Does Information Asymmetry Affect Corporate Tax Aggressiveness? (2017, positive): “Graham et al. (2014) also provide evidence suggesting that firms benefit from 9 suggests that because analysts distribute their findings on firms’ tax structure to the investors through analyst report and mass media, analyst coverage increases the cost of tax avoidance14 and reduces managers’…”
The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, neutral): “Indirect costs include political costs, reputation concerns, financial reporting effects, and increased IRS and financial statement auditor scrutiny (e.g., Zimmerman 1983, Graham et al. 2014, Mills 1998, Frank et al. 2009, Hoopes et al. 2012).”
The taxman cometh: Does tax uncertainty affect corporate cash holdings? (2017, positive): “For example, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), Graham et al. (2014), and Gallemore et al. (2014) examine whether firms are concerned about reputational effects of tax avoidance and whether firms bear reputational costs (measured in a variety of ways) upon revelation of tax aggressive activities.”