CAPITAL, LABOR, AND THE FIRM: A STUDY OF GERMAN CODETERMINATION

By Gary B. Gorton, F. Schmid. 2004

281 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/11b2273350bfe7cbc249d4330563a0c410703a17

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In Accounting

1. Ruth V. Aguilera
2. Gregory Jackson
3. W. Megginson
4. Timothée Waxin
5. Edith Ginglinger
6. C. Jones
7. Yama Temouri
8. Igor Filatotchev

In Finance

1. W. Megginson
2. Edith Ginglinger
3. C. Jones
4. Gregory Jackson
5. Ruth V. Aguilera
6. Yama Temouri

Citations in the corpus

• The Link Between Job Satisfaction and Firm Value, With Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, unknown): “Dhrymes (1998) found no relationship with KLD’s employee relations variable, and Gorton and Schmid (2004) showed that greater employee involvement reduces firm value.”
• Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value (2009, unknown): “firm value rather than decrease it finds some support in Gorton and Schmid (2004) and”
• Is Busy Really Busy? Board Governance Revisited (2013, unknown): “7 See the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) for a comprehensive description of the rights and duties of the supervisory board.”
• Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining (2010, unknown): “Grout (1984) and Baldwin (1983) adopt similar approaches in modeling investment.”
• The determinants of tax haven FDI (2016, background): “This rests on the notion that the suppliers of equity capital and the suppliers of labour manage the firm cooperatively (Gorton & Schmid, 2004).”
• Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards (2006, unknown): “This result contrasts with that of Gorton and Schmid (2004).”
• Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Despite contrary econometric results (Gorton & Schmid, 2004) and welldocumented methodological problems in defining a control group or measure of codetermination in Germany (Höpner & Müllenborn, 2010), no systematic evidence exists to suggest that strong employee voice at the board level has a…”
• Employee Ownership, Board Representation, and Corporate Financial Policies (2011, background): “Gorton and Schmid (2004) examine German companies with equal representation by employees and shareholders, and find that these companies trade at a 31% market discount compared to companies where employee representatives fill only one-third of the supervisory board seats.”