Auditors' response to political connections and cronyism in Malaysia: Management of slipped adjustable gastric bands
By Ferdinand A. Gul. 2006
373 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/119affbacc417485763ba400fb2c9a1cbb02103d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Gerald J. Lobo
- T. Wong
- C. Lim
- Kiridaran Kanagaretnam
- Tianyu Zhang
- Joseph D. Piotroski
- N. Subramaniam
- Sakthi Mahenthiran
In Strategy and Management
- T. Wong
- N. Subramaniam
- C. Lim
- Joseph D. Piotroski
- Sakthi Mahenthiran
- Suhaily Hasnan
- Yuping Zhao
- Gerald J. Lobo
Citations in the corpus
- Ownership Structure and Intellectual Capital Performance in Malaysia (2009, neutral): “Gul (2006) argues that politically connected companies face a higher risk of being audited during financial crises due to their vulnerability.”
- Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, neutral): “23 For a detailed description of these models and their assumptions, please refer to the appendices in Hail and Leuz (2006) and El Ghoul et al.”
- Institutions and Information Environment of Chinese Listed Firms (2012, background): “Additionally, Wang, Wong and Xia (2008), Guedhami and Pittman (2006), Gul (2006) and Guedhami, Pittman and Saffar (2009) examine the impact of political forces on the quality of information around privatization events, and find that corporate transparency and the use of a high quality auditor after…”
- The Effect of China's Weak Institutional Environment on the Quality of Big 4 Audits (2015, neutral): “Thus, we avoid the problem of unobserved differences between countries (Miller 2004; Gul 2006).”
- Effects of International Institutional Factors on Earnings Quality of Banks (2014, positive): “8 We control for creditor rights (CR_RIGHTS) since Shen and Chih (2005) and Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) suggest that the rights accorded to creditors likely reduce earnings management, as stronger creditor rights against borrower expropriation reduce bank risk in lending activities and thus their in”
- Internal audit function, board quality and financial reporting quality: evidence from Malaysia (2013, background): “Prior studies have shown a link between political connections, corporate governance and audit fees (Gul, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).”
- Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “S.) data finds that firms tend to remain opaque in the presence of strong political economy forces, as measured by level of state ownership of assets, greater risk of expropriation, and the presence of political connections (e.g., Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith [2004], Bushman and Piotroski [2006], G”
- Management Motive, Weak Governance, Earnings Management, and Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Malaysian Evidence (2013, background): “1 Following the ethnic riots in 1969, the NEP was initiated by the government to correct the imbalance between Chinese and indigenous Malay (Bumiputera) in the economy, where the economy was predominantly run by the Chinese to the exclusion of Malays (Gul 2006).”
- Relation between Audit Effort and Financial Report Misstatements: Evidence from Quarterly and Annual Restatements (2013, positive): “Measuring Audit Effort and Abnormal Audit Effort We use audit fees to proxy for audit effort (Gul 2006; Srinidhi and Gul 2007; Rice and Weber 2012).”