Institutions and Information Environment of Chinese Listed Firms

By Joseph D. Piotroski, T. Wong. 2012

269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper describes the financial reporting practices and information environment of Chinese listed firms and documents the influence that local and country-level institutions have on reporting incentives and the resultant information environment. We identify four key institutional arrangements that influence the supply and demand for information about Chinese listed firms: the State’s controlling ownership of listed firms, the government’s control of capital markets, the limited protection of property rights and weak market institutions, a lack of independence of local auditors, and the importance of social networks and political connections. The paper concludes by discussing how actual and potential changes in these institutional arrangements would likely influence China’s information environment.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea1dd52f3dba228f1e88259bd0e41fba4f89a9b1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

Citations in the corpus

Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China (2014, background): “See Piotroski and Wong (2012) for a detailed discussion of this issue.”
Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China? (2014, background): “First, due to the country’s weaker information environment (Piotroski and Wong 2011), the importance of analyst coverage to the individual investors may be greater than in many other countries.”
Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “A more detailed discussion about the relation between institutions and the information environment of listed firms in China can be found in Piotroski and Wong [2012]. In this subsection, I will focus more on the governance role of accounting rather than the firms’ general information environment, an”
Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes (2016, unknown): “3 demand for high-quality financial reporting in China is typically low (Piotroski and Wong, 2012).”
Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “2 Incentives to provide and suppress negative financial information in China Prior research documents that China’s financial markets and listed firms are associated with a poor information environment (see Piotroski and Wong (2010) for a summary).”
Risks in China's Financial System (2018, unknown): “See Piotroski and Wong (2012) and Allen and Shen (2012) for detailed accounts of the information environment and legal enforcement related to publicly listed firms in China.”