Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea

By Kooyul Jung, S. Kwon. 2002

191 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data (2007, background): “Jung and Kwon (2002) look at earnings informativeness instead of firm performance.”
Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding (2009, methodology): “Hypothesis 3a), we used Kaufmann et al.’s (2005) oft-used ‘rule of law’ measure.”
Ownership Structure and Earnings Management in Malaysian Listed Companies: The Size Effect (2008, background): “These include corporate governance mechanisms (Klein, 2002, Singh & Davidson, 2003), external auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Becker et al., 1988,) and block holders (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Peasnell et al., 2000; Yeo et al., 2002; Jung et al., 2002; Jiambalvo et al., 2002 and Singh & Davidson, 2003).”
Ownership Structure and Intellectual Capital Performance in Malaysia (2009, unknown): “…& Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov, Givoly & Hayn, 2002), managerial ownership (Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995), block ownership (Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000; Yeo, Tan, Ho & Chen, 2002; Jung & Kwon, 2002; Singh & Davidson, 2003) and audit committee (Klein, 2002), may significantly reduce the agency costs.”