Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox

By Joan Esteban, Debraj Ray. American Political Science Review, 2001

363 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/10d181fd075b4f99458c96997fe79b7f38ad77c8

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Citations in the corpus

A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy (2003, methodology): “(3) Simplifying and taking feasibility constraints into account, we obtain Ai’s best response: φ∗i (2) = 0 if wi ≤ 0min{wi(1−φ−i) 2mi , 1} if wi > 0.”
Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya (2005, background): “Chamberlin (1974) and Esteban and Ray (2001) suggest that if anything, larger groups are likely to be more effective at collective action in the provision of pure public goods, which would strengthen the main result in Proposition 1.”
Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions (2008, neutral): “The fact that the effect of M on p∗ is ambiguous is also related to the point made by Esteban and Ray (2001), which emphasizes that the effect of an increase in the number of agents to the total contribution to a lobby will be ambiguous because, while each agent contributes less, there are more of…”
Group contest success functions (2009, background): “3 A partial list is: Katz et al. (1990), Nitzan (1991), Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), Wärneryd (1998), Esteban and Ray (2001), Müller and Wärneryd (2001), Garfinkel (2004a), Garfinkel (2004b), Hausken (2005), Baik (2008), Inderst et al. (2007), Münster (2007), Münster…”
Economics of Conflict: An Overview (2006, background): “Also see Esteban and Ray (2001).”
Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (2015, neutral): “This paradox has been proven theoretically in some contexts (e.g., Katz and Tokatlidu, 1996; Baik and Lee, 1997), but not in others (e.g., Sandler, 1993; Esteban and Ray, 2001).”
The theory of contests: a survey (2007, background): “Esteban and Ray (2001) o¤er an interesting twist to the previous argument -and a partial vindication of Olson s conjecture- by assuming that Vi = V=n i ; where 0 1: When = 0 the object is a pure public good -which is the case considered before- and when = 1 the object is a pure private good.”
A Model of Ethnic Conflict (2011, methodology): “8Esteban and Ray (1999) employ a group-based approach, and Esteban and Ray (2001) address the Pareto-Olson group size paradox by taking an individual-based approach.”
Smallholder Farmers and Collective Action: What Determines the Intensity of Participation? (2014, background): “reversed when the collective good produced is public; in other words the individual’s payoff is unaffected by the number of group members (Esteban and Ray 2001).”