Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions

By Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson. 2008

1,300 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/40a49443e7baea4ad484c6e92765d181bc70641d

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Citations in the corpus

Institutional infrastructure and economic growth in member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (2015, background): “…of different sets of institutions can be drawn from a recent theoretical view suggesting that political institutions are themost important dimension in the aggregate institutional matrix, the “hierarchy of institutions hypothesis” (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2005).”
The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, neutral): “It is argued that the absence of such protective institutions allows wealthy families to leverage their positions of economic strength into political power to influence public policy and, in extreme cases, even “capture” the state (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).”
Good corporate governance in Nigeria: Antecedents, propositions and peculiarities (2015, background): “Theories of political institutionalism (North, 1990; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008) are also useful in offering insights applicable to similar weak governance environments.”
The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution (2011, result): “16 Though it is possible that our urbanization measure fails to capture the short-run destructive effects of the French wars, the working paper version of our work (Acemoglu et al. 2009) reported cross-country evidence showing similar results with Maddison’s estimates of GDP per capita. 17 This argu”
International Trade and Institutional Change (2013, neutral): “∗I am grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Michael Alexeev, Julian di Giovanni, Simon Johnson, Nuno Limão, Jaume Ventura, Josep Vilarrubia, the editor (John Morgan), two anonymous referees, and workshop participants at Dartmouth College, University of Maryland, CEPR (Stockholm), the IAE-CSIC Conference on I”
Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation (2012, methodology): “Following more recent work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), if “de facto power” of those at the top of the wealth distribution outweighs the shift in “de jure” power, then we might not necessarily expect to observe that suffrage extensions produce shifts toward significantly more progressive…”
Productivity Differences Between and Within Countries (2009, neutral): “Robinson (2008) for a model of de jure and de facto institutional differences, with a discussion of the importance of de facto institutional differences in the development of the US South.”
The Scope of Cooperation: Norms and Incentives (2007, background): “Acemoglu et al. 2001, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Tabellini 2005, Rajan and Zingales 2006, Rajan 2006, Glaeser et al. 2005).”
Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule (2012, background): “)e depiction of RMD as a clash between the “elite” and the “masses” is also reductive in a second sense. )e economy in Boix (2003) is thought of as a distribution of individuals (heterogeneous in incomes)”