Do occupational pension funds monitor companies in which they hold large stakes

By Mara Faccio, M. Lasfer. 2000

282 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Company Dividends and Ownership Structure: Evidence from UK Panel Data (2006, unknown): “Faccio and Lasfer (2000) analyze the monitoring role of pension funds in 289 companies which had pension fund stakes greater than 3% in 1995-96 and nd that companies with high levels of pension fund ownership are not likely to be more ef cient or to pay more dividends than industry counterparts.”
Corporate Governance, Accountability and Mechanisms of Accountability: An Overview (2008, background): “There has been a steady growth of research into their developing role as monitors of corporate management (e.g. Coffee, 1991; Karpo et al., 1996; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000) and the evolving relationship between institutional investors and their investee company management (Holland and Stoner, 1996; Ho”
Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value (2005, result): “This result is consistent with Faccio and Lasfer (1999, 2000).”
Insider Trading, News Releases and Ownership Concentration (2006, background): “This suggests a higher information content of directors’ transactions and confirms the findings by Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) and Faccio and Lasfer (2002) that UK institutional shareholders do not monitor the firms they invest in and do not mitigate problems of asymmetric information.”