Ownership Structure, Managerial Behavior and Corporate Value
By J. Davies, D. Hillier, Patrick McColgan. 2005
278 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/abced784313c39a390e3200fc89b11c25d5b1926
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Citations in the corpus
- Managerial Ownership and Performance (2009, unknown): “Finally, following earlier studies on the subject (Davies et al., 2005; Short and Keasey, 1999), the empirical specification also controls for size, leverage and investment differences across firms by including the variables LEVERAGE, which is the ratio of total debt to total assets, SIZE, which is ”
- Effect of Managerial Ownership, Financial Leverage, Profitability, Firm Size, and Investment Opportunity on Dividend Policy and Firm Value (2013, background): “Investment was a very important decision for firm because it was directly related to firm objectives achievement to maximize firm value (Myers, 1977; Fama, 1978) . Results show investment opportunity (capital expenditure to total assets) has a positive effect on firm value. This shows consideration ”
- Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany (2008, unknown): “…dependence of insider ownership and firm performance.20 20Similar simultaneous equation systems were used, among others, by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Cho (1998) Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005), and Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, and Zimmermann (2005) to address the potential endogeneity effect.”
- Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms (2016, background): “While Davies et al. (2005) showed a positive effect of leverage on firm performance, there are studies showing a negative effect of firm leverage on firm performance (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Andres, 2008; Gurbuz & Aybars, 2010).”
- Managerial Ownership, Capital Structure and Firm Value: Evidence from China’s Civilian-run Firms (2011, methodology): “Managerial labour markets operate on the principal that poorly performing managers can be removed and appropriately disciplined (Davies et al. 2005).”