Do Today's Trades Affect Tomorrow's IPO Allocations?
By M. Nimalendran, Jay R. Ritter, Donghang Zhang. 2007
165 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74d02775620ba2ae2de8ee988504679f93dce177
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Finance
- Jay R. Ritter
- Rongbing Huang
- Donghang Zhang
- K. Hanley
- Özde Öztekin
- Amy K. Dittmar
- Malcolm P. Baker
- Rajesh K. Aggarwal
Citations in the corpus
- Affiliated Mutual Funds and the Allocation of Initial Public Offerings (2007, unknown): “This subperiod, often referred to as the internet bubble period, is characterized as a hot IPO market with severe underpricing and aggressive commission payments (Nimalendran et al., 2006).”
- Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns (2009, unknown): “A broker’s best institutional clients get larger allocations of “hot” IPOs, and the larger profits associated with them (Fulghieri and Spiegel 1993; Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang 2007).20 It is obvious that brokers cannot explicitly charge for this service, and so they allocate shares to those who…”
- Local Underwriter Oligopolies and IPO Underpricing (2011, unknown): “First, underwriters can allocate underpriced shares to investors in exchange for soft dollar commission business (Loughran and Ritter, 2002, 2004; Reuter, 2006; Hoberg, 2007; and Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang, 2007).”
- Purchasing IPOs with Commissions (2011, unknown): “Reuter (2006) uses mutual fund family holdings as a proxy for IPO allocations.”
- Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market (2011, background): “Nimalendran, Ritter, and Zhang (2007) document that trading volume in non-IPO stocks is unusually high immediately surrounding hot IPOs.”