Lending Credibility

By R. Stone. 2002

284 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Finance, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/10256ccc12ec6ebde9266823f3282db1e72102cb

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Citations in the corpus

Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, background): “Similarly, Mosley et al. (2004) share the view that aid could be more effective if it were reallocated to less corrupt recipient countries.”
The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid (2010, background): “Svensson (2000b), for example, examines a conditionality game with one donor and multiple recipients, while Stone (2002) introduces investors as a third player in addition to donor and recipient.”
The Politics of Hard Choices: IMF Programs and Government Spending (2006, background): “…services, is the role fiscal adjustments play in IMF programs+ While IMF programs differ across countries, they 1+ See Bird 2003; Crisp and Kelly 1999; Stone 2002; and Vreeland 2003+ 2+ Buira 2003a, 61, fig+ 1+ 3+ Ibid+, 62, fig+ 2+ Dreher and Jensen also document an increase in the number of…”
The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality (2016, background): “More specifically, it examines whether the activities of “the most powerful international institution in history” (Stone 2002, p. 1) – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – contribute to the explanation for why inequality has been rising in so many countries.”
Politics and IMF Conditionality (2015, unknown): “Zimbabwe was reportedly threatened with additional IMF conditions if it failed to vote along with the United States on important resolutions pertaining to Iraq (Pilger 1992, 182; 2002).”
The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, background): “…of the problems to be solved+ 9+ Meltzer 2000+ 10+ See Thacker 1999; Barro and Lee 2005; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody 2006; and Stone 2002 and 2004+ For a review of the recent quantitative literature on IMF lending, see Steinwand and Stone 2008+ 11+ See Polak 1991; Gould…”
Do Countries Have a “Democratic Advantage”? (2005, background): “Rodrik (1996) and Stone (2002) discuss additional reasons for multilateral lending, including agencies’ predisposition to defend their reputations. the rescheduling or default probability of all debtors.”
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation (2009, background): “…in 31+ Roth 2008+ 32+ See Alesina and Dollar 2000; and Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998+ 33+ Stone 2008+ 34+ Bjornlund 2004+ 35+ See Kelley 2004; and Stone 2002+ Russia, Kenya, Cambodia, and elsewhere in the 1990s suggest that international monitors may be similarly torn between praising progress—a…”
IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies (2006, background): “For example, in work on Eastern Europe and Africa, Stone (2002, 2004) shows that the IMF only tends to be fairly consistent and technocratic when initially punishing a country for noncompliance.”
The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements (2009, background): “…have explored the impact of donor interests on IFIs including the IMF (Andersen et al., 2006b; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Harrigan et al., 2006; Stone, 2002, 2004; Thacker, 1999; Vreeland, 2005), the World Bank (Andersen et al., 2006a; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Frey and Schneider, 1986; Harrigan…”