Earnings Manipulation in Failing Firms

By Rebecca L. Rosner. 2003

383 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0eccac41667b0b7521dc0a5e0174f64b7ae067ba

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Citations in the corpus

Earnings Management: An Analysis of Opportunistic Behaviour, Monitoring Mechanism and Financial Distress (2015, background): “Rosner (2003) reports that firms that become bankrupts ex post, but do not appear ex ante, engage in income-increasing earnings manipulation practices.”
Earnings Quality and Ownership Structure: The Role of Private Equity Sponsors (2009, positive): “Finally, PE-backed public firms appear to manage earnings downward in the two years prior to filing for bankruptcy, consistent with the incentive of managers, especially in public firms, to avoid the threat of lawsuits by stakeholders (Rosner 2003).”
The impact of SME’s pre-bankruptcy financial distress on earnings management tools (2015, background): “Indeed, bankrupt companiesmanipulate earnings upwards in comparison with healthy firms (Campa & Camacho-Miñano, 2014; Rosner, 2003) and, in some cases, entities do that to ‘clean’ the negative signals of financial distress (Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009; Jaggi & Lee, 2002; Sweeney, 1994).”
Internal Control Weaknesses and Financial Reporting Fraud (2017, background): “managers to commit fraud (Rosner 2003).”
Earnings quality in ex‐post failed firms (2009, methodology): “Expost bankrupt firms that ex-ante do not show signs of failure are expected to have engaged in more aggressive accounting practices (Rosner, 2003), or at least, in practices that successfully masked poor performance.8 To identify them, we calculate the ex-ante one-year-ahead probability of…”
The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs (2017, background): “4 We follow Rosner (2003), Iqbal, Espenlaub & Laub (2009) and Athanasakou, Strong & Walker (2011) by using 6 observations.”
The Nature of Accounting Information Reliability: Inferences from Archival and Experimental Research (2006, background): “…Bonner, Palmrose, and Young (1998), Beneish (1999), Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1999), Lee, Ingram, and Howard (1999), Palmrose and Scholz (2003), Rosner (2003), and others. financial accounting researchers, under terms of strict confidentiality, could get firm-specific internal data used for…”
Corporate governance and earnings management in concentrated markets (2020, neutral): “…management measures and make sure that OLS assumption regarding the normality of the error term holds (e.g., (Alhadab & Clacher, 2017; Athanasakou, Strong, & Walker, 2009; García Lara, García Osma, & Mora, 2005; Iqbal, Espenlaub, & Strong, 2009; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005; Rosner, 2003)).”
Real and accrual earnings management and IPO failure risk (2015, result): “…10 observations for each industry-year group and the results are qualitatively similar but this restriction leads to a large decrease in our sample size and, therefore, we follow Rosner (2003), Athanasakou et al. (2009), Iqbal et al. (2009) and Athanasakou et al. (2011) and use six observations.”
Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud (2008, background): “Fraudulent misrepresentations violate “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP), often to the end of achieving a desired level of reported earnings (Rosner, 2003).”