The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries

By R. Hodler. 2006

504 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0d04e115d34def55de889adf11eb9542e61b0c2e

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Citations in the corpus

Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions (2014, background): “In fact, many studies have demonstrated that resource abundance has a negative association with institutional quality (Bulte & Damania, 2005; Hodler, 2006; Isham et al., 2005; Leite & Weidmann 1999; Ross 1999, 2001; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003, among others) through lack of integrity, rampant…”
Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers (2009, background): “In ethnically divided countries, resource rents cause more intense fighting between groups to appropriate rents, which undermines productive activities and property rights (Hodler, 2006).”
More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries (2011, background): “48 Hodler (2006) shows that natural resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogeneous countries. 49 Without controlling for region fixed effects, the oil coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level. With region fixed effect, the coefficient is not s”
Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, background): “…(Gylfason et al. 1999; Gylfason 2001), lead to rent-seeking (Baland and Francois 2000; Torvik 2002), increase incidences of social conflict and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Hodler 2006; Olsson 2007), or undermine institutional quality (Ades and Tella 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Auty 2001).”
Commodity Prices, Growth, and the Natural Resource Curse: Reconciling a Conundrum (2008, background): “This can occur through a weakening of the state, easy finance for rebels and warlords (Skaperdas, 2002), or quasi-criminal activities and gang rivalries (Mehlum et al., 2006; Hodler, 2006).”
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict (2014, background): “F or p er so na l u se o nl y. Recognizing this point, Hodler (2006) develops a model in which property rights to produced output is endogenous and varies with the intensity of fighting (an effect external to warring factions).”
The evolution of the natural resource curse thesis: A critical literature survey (2017, background): “In the first vein, resource rents are thought to bring not only conflict but also corruption and downward pressures on institutional quality (Hodler, 2006; Iimi, 2007; Frankel, 2012).”
Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity (2009, background): “They, as well as Gylfason (2001), Ding and Field (2005 )a nd Hodler (2006) use estimates of 1994 subsoil abundance from the World Bank.”
Extending the concept of the resource curse: natural resources and public spending on health (2014, background): “Hodler (2006) finds that the effect of natural resources on income is positive in ethnically homogeneous countries, but becomes increasingly negative as ethnic fractionalization increases.”
Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not? (2009, background): “Other resource-curse models within the rent-seeking tradition include, among others, Baland and Francois (2000), Hodler (2006) , Mehlum et al. (2006), and Wick and Bulte (2006).”