Some doubts about measuring self-interest using dictator experiments: the costs of anonymity

By N. Frohlich, J. Oppenheimer, J. Moore. 2001

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0cb357c4d8fccf4a5341d5dc80405a98c5c64b05

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Gary Charness
2. Martin A. Dufwenberg
3. Uri Gneezy
4. Astri Muren
5. Pablo Brañas-Garza
6. Sonja Pointner
7. Axel Franzen
8. Peter Kuhn

In General Decision Sciences

1. Gary Charness
2. Martin A. Dufwenberg
3. Uri Gneezy
4. Pablo Brañas-Garza
5. Sonja Pointner
6. Axel Franzen
7. Ernst Fehr
8. Armin Falk

In Safety Research

1. Gary Charness
2. Uri Gneezy
3. Ernst Fehr
4. Pablo Brañas-Garza
5. Martin A. Dufwenberg
6. Astri Muren
7. Sonja Pointner
8. Axel Franzen

Citations in the corpus

• Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity (2003, background): “As Frohlich et al. (2001) points out, when experimental subjects view the DG as a game they behave as players and go to the lab to earn money.”
• Anonymity in the Dictator Game Revisited (2012, methodology): “Selection from closed envelopes was done randomly (second random 4 This was already pointed out by Frohlich et al. (2001) and Eckel and Grossman (1996). device) so that an expected number of 4.36 subjects should be in each allocated money category due to both random devices.”
• What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games (2008, background): “Frohlich et al. (2001) find that measures taken to ensure anonymity in a double-blind dictator design lead to doubts concerning whether one is actually paired with a real person who would receive any money allocated; such doubts are significantly negatively correlated with giving.”
• Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games (2007, background): “…(see, among others, Burham, 2003 or Charness & Gneezy, 2001); the lack of an appropriate social context (Eckel and Grossman, 1996), which promotes both social behavior and increases dictator responsibility and, even more so, the lack of credibility about the experiment (see Frohlich et al., 2001).”
• Generosity, anonymity, gender (2006, background): “A stark example of this is provided by Frohlich et al. (2000), who report that as anonymity is increased in dictator games, subjects in the dictator position may start disbelieving the very existence of a recipient.”