Identification of decision rules in experiments on simple games of proposal and response
By Charles F. Manski. 2002
118 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0c8cebc3774b41517034385cb7a3cb55e0ec4185
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Anke Becker
- Thomas J. Dohmen
- Armin Falk
- basit. zafar
- A. Soest
- Olivier Armantier
- Charles Bellemare
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Steven N. Durlauf
- Thomas J. Dohmen
- Yannis M. Ioannides
- Armin Falk
- William A. Brock
- A. Soest
- Olivier Armantier
- Anke Becker
In Safety Research
- Thomas J. Dohmen
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Armin Falk
- Anke Becker
- Fabian Kosse
- Thomas Deckers
- Steven N. Durlauf
- Peter Hans Matthews
Citations in the corpus
- The Relationship between Economic Preferences and Psychological Personality Measures (2012, background): “Even in an experiment, however, the identification of preferences is limited (see Manski (2002) for a thorough discussion on the identification of experimental outcomes).”
- Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity? (2012, methodology): “…the lengthy instrunctions at their own pace and were required to answer three control questions correctly before being allowed to continue.5 Second, inspired by the discussion in Manski (2002), each participant was asked to enumerate some of their beliefs before deciding how much to contribute.”
- Promises, Threats and Fairness (2004, unknown): “Manski (2002) emphasizes the need for more careful treatment of expectations in experimental work, proposing that elicitation of expectations from subjects would be particularly valuable.”
- On the Empirics of Social Capital (2002, unknown): “Further, as discussed by Manski (2002) in an important recent paper, there are identification problems in experiments as it is often difficult to distinguish behavior that is driven by altruistic preferences from behavior driven by selfish preferences but with expectations of trustworthy behavior…”
- Identification of Social Interactions (2011, background): “First, Manski (2002) has observed that without restrictions on beliefs and decision rules other than that they rationalize choice (that is, without any equilibrium restrictions), the distribution of players’ types may not be identified.”
- College Major Choice and the Gender Gap (2013, background): “Second, different combinations of preferences and expectations may lead to the same choice (Manski 2002).”
- Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging (2010, background): “In particular, Manski (2002, 2004) argues that separate measures of choices and beliefs are useful to estimate decision models properly.”
- MEASURING INEQUITY AVERSION IN A HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION USING EXPERIMENTAL DECISIONS AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES (2008, background): “First, as discussed by Manski (2002), many experimental studies rely on assumptions regarding agents’ expectations about other players’ actions (such as rational expectations) to identify preferences, since observed choice data is generally not rich enough to uncover both expectations (’beliefs’)…”
- A penny for your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs (2014, unknown): “The beliefs of experimental subjects are often of great interest to experimentalists, as choice data alone are often not sufficient to distinguish between different theories (Manski, 2002, 2004).”