Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis

By G. Atkinson, K. Hamilton. 2003

561 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0c352223e322b7b47fcacb906b8fce22bb15bb32

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Citations in the corpus

Resource intensity, institutions, and development (2005, background): “For example, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) argue that the curse might follow from host countries’ inability to manage resource revenues sustainably, resulting in lower or negative rates of ‘‘genuine savings’’ (savings adjusted for resource depletion).”
Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions (2014, background): “In a different manner, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural resource abundance may have negative effects on development when weak institutions allow resource profits to be spent in government consumption rather than investment, especially in countries with low levels of genuine saving. Rod”
Dependency redux: why Africa is not rising (2016, background): “This has huge implications for the ‘Africa Rising’ story, because the majority of this ‘rising’ has been built on non-renewable extraction – and resource-rich countries are historically the poorest genuine savers (Atkinson and Hamilton 2003).”
Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana (2009, background): “Consumption and some forms of investment, on the other hand, do not prevent and may exacerbate Dutch Disease (Karl, 1997; Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; compare Auty, 2001a).”
Globalisation, governance, accountability and the natural resource ‘curse’: Implications for socio-economic growth of oil-rich developing countries (2019, background): “Several studies on the traditional causes of the natural resource ‘curse’ (NRC), such as Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), Auty (2002), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), Davis and Tilton (2005), Humphreys et al. (2007) including Mehlum et al. (2006), find that oil discovery in developing countries,…”
Energy Governance, Transnational Rules, and the Resource Curse: Exploring the Effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (2016, methodology): “Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006).”
Ecological Unequal Exchange: Consumption, Equity, and Unsustainable Structural Relationships within the Global Economy (2007, background): “It is considered a ‘paradoxical but seemingly robust’ fi nding (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003: 1793) and a ‘reasonably solid fact’ (Sachs and Warner, 2001: 837).”
Corruption, the resource curse and genuine saving (2007, unknown): “Unsurprisingly, the resource curse on economic growth has generated a substantial literature over the past half-century or more that has sought to explain it (Auty 2001; Isham et al. 2003; Gylfason 2001; Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).”
Economic Growth and Sustainable Development in Indonesia: An Assessment (2018, background): “Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) conduct a cross-country assessment to determine whether resource-rich countries fail to transform their natural resource rent into savings.”
Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse (2008, background): “…of our focus on political opposition is that the model links the resource curse to the degree of democracy or authoritarianism in the economy, 1 Gylfason (2001) and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) employ different proxies for resource wealth, and find that the qualitative results are unaffected.”
Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic growth (2008, unknown): “For example, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) use the ratio of resource rents to GDP to show both positive and negative economic effects, and Stijns (2006) also argues in favor of using resource rent data, although he prefers per capita measures. In this group of empirical work as well, differentiating ”
Natural resources, financial development and institutional quality in Africa: Is there a resource curse? (2018, background): “Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) show that natural resource abundance may have negative effects on development when weak institutions allow resource profits to be spent in government consumption rather than investment, especially in countries with low levels of genuine saving. Girma and Shortland (2008)”
The political economy of the resource curse : a literature survey (2006, background): “Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) found that savings rates are on average lower in resource abundant countries than in resource poor countries.”