Resources for Sale: Corruption, Democracy and the Natural Resource Curse

By Erwin H. Bulte, R. Damania. 2008

168 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d9f368c87f9c9888b7444114c6d3071dc30db1e2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Ivar Kolstad
2. S. Lin
3. Donghyeon Kim
4. A. James
5. Tina Søreide
6. Ragnar Torvik
7. F. van der ploeg
8. Paul Collier

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Ivar Kolstad
2. Donghyeon Kim
3. S. Lin
4. Tina Søreide
5. A. James
6. David Aadland
7. Ragnar Torvik
8. F. van der ploeg

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Tina Søreide
2. A. James
3. S. Lin
4. Ivar Kolstad
5. Donghyeon Kim
6. Ragnar Torvik
7. C. Corrigan

Citations in the corpus

• Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, background): “…there is also evidence of an economic curse (blessing) conditional on having poor (good) institutions (Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006; Boschini et al. 2007, 2013; Collier and Goderis 2007; Olsson 2007; Bulte and Damania 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010, 2014; Bjorvatn et al. 2012).”
• Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not? (2009, background): “Damania and Bulte (2003) show that when politicians maximize the surplus from a lobbying game, resource abundance may increase the income from lobbying, but divert the economy from its optimal path.”
• Cursed by Resources or Institutions (2006, unknown): “2 On institutions see Karl (1997), Ross (2001a), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Bulte et al. (2005), Collier and Hoeffler (2005); on governance see Ross (2001b), Damania and Bulte (2003) , Murshed (2003); on civil conflict see Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Ross (2004), Olsson (2004), Lujala e”
• Challenges and Opportunities for Resource Rich Economies (2006, unknown): “Those profiting from the natural resource sector may bribe politicians to provide specific semi-public goods at the expense of support to manufacturing, which lowers welfare if manufacturing enjoys returns to scale (Damania and Bulte, 2003).”
• The curse of natural resources: An empirical investigation of U.S. counties § (2011, background): “Countries or regions with institutions to protect against civil conflict are, therefore, less likely to be impacted by the natural resource curse (Mehlum et al., 2006; Bulte and Damania, 2008).”
• Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers (2009, background): “If a government is challenged by a political opponent, this implies that there are limits to how far it can go in supporting one sector or social group over others (Damania and Bulte, 2003).”