Short Sellers and Financial Misconduct

By Jonathan M. Karpoff, Xiaoxia Lou. 2010

539 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/08255d7d38de76267f14ecce9d191cd338534d77

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Citations in the corpus

Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “The outsize number of detected fraud cases in recent years has led to regulatory changes, as well as to growing interest in the determinants and prevention of fraud due to the high costs to market participants (e.g., Ball, 2009; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Kedia and Philippon, 2009).”
Big Data as a Governance Mechanism (2019, unknown): “Consistent with these theoretical predictions, multiple studies find that short sellers increase the informational efficiency of prices (e.g., Dechow et al. 2001; Karpoff and Lou 2010; Boehmer and Wu 2012) and discipline managers’ behavior (e.”
Competition of the Informed: Does the Presence of Short Sellers Affect Insider Selling? (2015, background): “It is well-documented that short sellers are able to identify overvalued or “suspicious” stocks (e.g., Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman, 2006; Cohen, Diether, and Malloy, 2007; Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh, 2010; K”
How are Shorts Informed? Short Sellers, News, and Information Processing (2012, unknown): “There is some evidence that short sellers anticipate bad news announcements (see, e.g., Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Karpoff and Lou, 2010).”
How are shorts informed (2012, background): “For example, Karpoff and Lou (2010) show that short selling increases before the initial public revelation of firms’ financial misrepresentation.”
Rank and File Employees and the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options (2016, unknown): “…not driven by this shortcoming and that, during periods of misreporting, firms grant additional rank and file stock options to their employees in an effort to encourage participation or silence, or both.28 25 See Desai et al. (2006), Karpoff and Lou (2010), and Efendi et al. (2005), among others.”
Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management (2012, unknown): “6 See Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004), Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b), Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008), Gande and Lewis (2009), and Karpoff and Lou (2010).”
Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment (2016, unknown): “To test the proposition that pilot firms’ misconduct will be discovered relatively quickly, we extend the time-to-discovery tests used by Karpoff and Lou (2010) to examine the effect of short selling on the speed with which financial misrepresentation is uncovered.”
Short interest and stock price crash risk (2015, background): “Karpoff and Lou (2010) examine short interest in firms that are investigated by SEC for financial misrepresentation, and find that abnormal short sales increase in the 19 months before the public revelation of misrepresentation.”