Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization
By Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, P. Willen. 2009
276 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/07db8856ed89c65f085b972bfdb4bcfcc6742e28
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Citations in the corpus
- Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (2010, unknown): “In other words, Adelino et al. (2009) are simply looking at a subset of tools that are employed by the servicers and their results on modifications are not in anyways at odds with our current findings.”
- Can't Pay or Won't Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default (2018, background): “…a future wave of mortgage defaults and foreclosures, and for designing loss mitigation policies that reduce the negative economic impacts of future possible foreclosure crises on lenders and homeowners (see for example, Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009), Foote et al. (2010), Adelino et al. (2013)).”
- The Role of Securitization in Mortgage Renegotiation (2011, unknown): “Adelino et al. (2009a; 2009b) and Foote et al. (2009) use an algorithm to identify renegotiations.”