Ownership concentration and corporate governance practices: substitution or expropriation effects?

By Yves-Marie Bozec, Richard Bozec. 2007

116 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Corporate Boards, Ownership Structures and Corporate Disclosures: Evidence from a Developing Country (2018, unknown): “The final section (section 5) presents the conclusions, policy implications of the results, and directions for future research.”
Corporate governance and impact on bank performance (2013, background): “Consequently, different control mechanisms either internal or external to the firm should be put in place in order to align the interests of managers and shareholders [3].”
The effectiveness of internal corporate governance and audit quality: the role of ownership concentration – Malaysian evidence (2018, background): “Bozec and Bozec (2007) argue that the controlling shareholders have incentives to maintain weak internal controls to facilitate their expropriation.”
Corporate Boards and Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly Listed Corporations (2018, methodology): “In line with the findings of past studies (Alsaeed, 2006; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Piesse et al., 2012; Soliman, 2013a, b), block ownership (BONR) is between a minimum of 0.00% (i.e., no block owners) and a maximum of 85.21% with a mean (median) of 61.96% (62.00%), suggesting that Saudi firms ownership…”