The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed In Equations and Graphs

By Christopher R. Hitchcock. 2001

517 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, History and Philosophy of Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/06ebc77dcdac4133c37bf0852a94f9b7cbda5ba8

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In Artificial Intelligence

In History and Philosophy of Science

Citations in the corpus

Detection of Unfaithfulness and Robust Causal Inference (2008, background): “Most counterexamples to causal transitivity in the literature are either cases of intransitivity of what is called total cause or cases of intransitivity of probability-increasing, which involve multiple causal pathways (Hitchcock 2001a).”
The problem of variable choice (2016, background): “The accounts of actual causation adopted by a number of authors (Hitchcock 2001; Halpern and Pearl 2005; Woodward 2003) reach different conclusions about whether the position of the switch (and whether the train goes going down the right hand track) is an actual cause of the arrival of the train,…”
Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals (2013, background): “The structural model framework has led to several related accounts of actual causation (Halpern & Pearl, 2005; Hitchcock, 2001, 2007a,b; Pearl, 2000/2009; Woodward, 2003).”
Causal-explanatory pluralism: How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions. (2010, background): “Additional responses to late preemption abound (e.g. Halpern & Pearl, 2001; Hitchcock, 2001; Menzies, 2003; Woodward, 2003).”
Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach (2000, background): “An example of preemption (taken from (Hitchcock 1999)) is a scenario where an assassin-in-training, who is an excellent shot, fires and kills the victim.”
Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach: Part 1: Causes (2013, background): “e it failed to occur. Lewis (1986, 2000) insists that causality is transitive, partly to be able to deal with whatis called intheliterature preemption(Lewis 1986). Anexample ofpreemption (taken from (Hitchcock 1999)) is a scenario where an assassin-in-training, who is an excellent shot, ﬁres and kil”
A Regularity Theoretic Approach to Actual Causation (2013, background): “Many of these theories operate within a broadly counterfactual framework that draws on structural equations (cf. e.g. Hitchcock 2001; 2007; Woodward 2003; Halpern and Pearl 2005; Halpern 2008; Halpern and Hitchcock 2010).”
Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm (2013, background): “More recently the direction of explanation has reversed and CBNs have been appealed to in analyzing counterfactual conditional reasoning both philosophically (Hitchcock, 2001, 2007; Woodward, 2003; Woodward & Hitchcock, 2003) and empirically (Rips, 2010).”
Counterfactual Theories of Causation (2001, background): “More recently, counterfactual-based accounts that partly reject conceptual reductionism have received a good deal of attention, particularly causal modeling accounts such as Pearl (2000), 31 Halpern and Pearl (2005), 32 and Hitchcock (2001).”
Causal reasoning with forces (2015, background): “, 2009; see also Hitchcock, 2001). The “:=” relation differs from “equal to” in that variables on one side of the relation cannot be moved to the other: causes must be kept on one side and effects on the other. Loosely stated, “:=” can be likened in meaning to the notion of “gets”; thus, rather than”