Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals

By David A. Lagnado, Tobias Gerstenberg, Ro’i Zultan. 2013

207 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over-determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

  1. Ruth M. J. Byrne
  2. Tobias Gerstenberg
  3. Matthew Botvinick
  4. Zeb Kurth-Nelson
  5. Jane X. Wang
  6. David A. Lagnado
  7. Joshua Knobe
  8. Mary Parkinson

In Philosophy

  1. Ruth M. J. Byrne
  2. Isabel Valera
  3. Amir-Hossein Karimi
  4. Pedro A. Ortega
  5. Bernhard Schölkopf
  6. David A. Lagnado
  7. Peter W. Battaglia
  8. Jacob Andreas

Citations in the corpus