Information asymmetry and the role of traceability systems

By J. Hobbs. 2004

332 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Food Science, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/050669018e606765d8d7ac9fc98683844245e0b4

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Citations in the corpus

Traceability in the Canadian Red Meat Sector: Do Consumers Care? (2005, background): “First, the credence nature of food safety and quality attributes may lead to markets being dominated by low-quality products if producers of high-quality (or “safer”) food are unable to offer credible assurances to consumers (Golan et al 2003a; Hobbs 2004).”
Exploring consumer purchase intentions towards traceable minced beef and beef steak using the theory of planned behavior (2018, background): “…(BSE or mad cow disease) in cattle, dioxin in 31 chicken feed and horsemeat in beef products have threatened consumer confidence in the food 32 industry and provided the impetus for the progression of laws, policies and standards regarding food 33 safety and quality management (Hobbs, 2004).”
Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality (2008, unknown): “With the cooperation of herd owners, livestock dealers and market operators as well as detailed record searches between United States and Canadian agencies, the authorities were able to trace the origin of the affected cow to Canada only after a week, but herd mates were never fully traced.”
The impacts of the food traceability system and consumer involvement on consumers' purchase intentions toward fast foods (2013, background): “Whenever information asymmetry comes into being, not only do the transaction costs of downstream firms and buyers rise (Hobbs, 2004), but the seller’s opportunistic behaviors also increase (Choe et al.”
Information asymmetry and traceability incentives for food safety (2012, background): “Following Holmström (1979), Tirole (1988), Goodhue (2000), and Starbird (2005), an agent’s contingent specific utility is additively separable in incentive payments and effort such that:”