Nativism in cognitive science

By Richard Samuels. 2002

147 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/04b4b131512fe7f5741e7fa910c6611844e9d9c1

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Peter Carruthers
2. Stephen Stich
3. Jedediah W. P. Allen
4. Chandra Sekhar Sripada
5. Mark H. Bickhard
6. Paul E. Griffiths
7. Stephen Laurence
8. Edouard Machery

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. Paul E. Griffiths
2. Peter Carruthers
3. Jedediah W. P. Allen
4. Chandra Sekhar Sripada
5. Mark H. Bickhard
6. Edouard Machery
7. Stefan Linquist
8. Stephen Stich

In Philosophy

1. Peter Carruthers
2. Jedediah W. P. Allen
3. Chandra Sekhar Sripada
4. Mark H. Bickhard
5. Paul E. Griffiths
6. Edouard Machery
7. Stephen Stich
8. J. Doris

Citations in the corpus

• A Framework for the Psychology of Norms (2006, background): “Though there is a large philosophical literature debating the best interpretation of innateness claims in psychology (Cowie, 1999; Griffiths, 2002; Samuels, 2002), for our purposes we can consider a normative rule to be innate if various genetic and developmental factors make it the case that the ru”
• Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate (2013, background): “Samuels (2002) has actually argued that innateness claims are claims that such and such should be considered primitive with respect to the domain in which the claim is being made.”
• Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (2002, background): “The notion of innateness has come in for subtle analysis recently, with many different proposals in play—none of which are as simple as ‘something is innate if it’s acquired by a brute causal process, learned if acquired by a rational causal process’ (Samuels, 2002).”
• The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, background): “4.5 Samuels’s Primitivism Richard Samuels (2002) has argued that when nativists claim that certain properties are innate, what they are really claiming is that such properties should be considered as ‘‘primitive’’ from the point of view of the framework within which such claims are made.”
• The vernacular concept of innateness (2009, background): “For example, when asked to imagine a raccoon that has been surgically modified to look and smell like a skunk, adults maintain that the animal is still a raccoon (Keil, 1989; see also Rips, 1989; Atran et al., 2001 with Yukatek adults; Sousa, Atran, and Medin, 2002 with Brazilian adults).”