Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing

By Robert R. Bliss, Mark J. Flannery. 2001

388 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0468f3be3a1392eb73b877270165bf9e9e2721fd

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Citations in the corpus

Market discipline of bank risk: Evidence from subordinated debt contracts (2005, background): “2 However,Bliss and Flannery (2002)point out that showing a positive relation between subordinated debt yields and bank risk does not mean that banks will actually respond to changes in these yields.”
Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test (2001, result): “These results come close to the question of whether markets merely monitor risk-taking by banks, or whether they " influence " risk-taking (Bliss and Flannery, 2000) by pricing such risks and reducing their ex ante profitability.”
Ownership Structure, Risk and Performance in the European Banking Industry (2007, neutral): “3 As pointed out by Bliss and Flannery (2000), to be effective direct market discipline requires a firm’s expected cost of funds to be a direct function of its risk profile.”
Ownership structure, market discipline, and banks risk-taking incentives under deposit insurance (2011, background): “The concept of agency costs as just described corresponds exactly to that of market discipline according to the generally accepted ‘monitoring-and-influence’ definition of this concept (see, e.g., Flannery, 2001; Bliss and Flannery, 2002).”
Opaque banks, price discovery, and financial instability (2012, neutral): “Some examples are Flannery and Sorescu (1996), Morgan and Stiroh (2001), Bliss and Flannery (2002), and Goyal (2005).”
Ownership Structure and Risk in Publicly Held and Privately Owned Banks (2011, background): “On the one hand, the market is expected to monitor or to influence the risk behavior of banks and therefore the impact of ownership changes on risk cannot be assessed without considering incentives driven by financial markets in terms of discipline (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001).”