The bounded rationality of probabilistic mental models.

By Gerd Gigerenzer. 1993

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Citations in the corpus

Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality. (1996, methodology): “cities, and vice versa for German students (Gigerenzer, 1993; Goldstein 1994; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1995; Hoffrage, 1994).”
Fast and frugal versus regression models of human judgement (2001, methodology): “Fast and frugal models were developed within the framework of probabilistic mental models (Gigerenzer, 1993; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991).”
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation (2006, background): “At one time, it was claimed, on evolutionary grounds, that we have a built-in cognitive ability to process frequencies but not one-case probabilities (Gigerenzer, 1993).”
Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality (2003, background): “…are revised in terms of estimating the 21 frequency of categories rather than judging probabilities that performance is improved (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1991, 1993; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; but see Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001).”
Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic. (2002, result): “In a study that is somewhat the reverse of this one, a less-ismore effect was demonstrated with German students who scored higher when tested on American cities than on German ones (Hoffrage, 1995; see also Gigerenzer, 1993).”
Heuristics and Biases: Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? (2002, unknown): “…and rational construals of the tasks in the heuristics and biases literature (Adler 1984; 1991; Berkeley & Humphreys 1982; Cohen 1981; 1986; Gigerenzer 1993; 1996a; Hilton 1995; Jepson et al. 1983; Kahneman & Tversky 1983; 1996; Lopes 1991; Nisbett 1981; Schwarz 1996) highlight the…”
Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes About Human Rationality Disappear (2002, background): “As we have already seen, Gigerenzer argues that if frequentism is true, then statements about the probability of single events are meaningless and, hence, that judgments about single events cannot violate probability theory (Gigerenzer 1993, 292-293).”