What do trade negotiators negotiate about? Empirical evidence from the World Trade Organization
By K. Bagwell, R. Staiger. 2011
259 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/02dd37cf0a277ee6f3b91ab9025be4af7a3c1d4d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Meredith A. Crowley
- C. Bown
- I. Werning
- Arnaud Costinot
- Jon Vogel
- Dave Donaldson
- Robert C. Johnson
- Emily J. Blanchard
In Political Science and International Relations
- Meredith A. Crowley
- I. Werning
- Robert C. Johnson
- Jon Vogel
- Emily J. Blanchard
- Dave Donaldson
- C. Bown
- Anna Maria Mayda
In Strategy and Management
- Meredith A. Crowley
- C. Bown
- Arnaud Costinot
- I. Werning
- Robert C. Johnson
- Jon Vogel
- Dave Donaldson
- Anna Maria Mayda
Citations in the corpus
- Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (2018, unknown): “s where the percent ethanol availability does not change. This a fuzzy design: the treatment of interest is whether a car buyer has access to ethanol fuel, which varies within (month,state) cells. 8. Bagwell and Staiger (2011), What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the W”
- A Theory of Capital Controls as Dynamic Terms-of-Trade Manipulation (2014, unknown): “…the case of a small open economy in which the rationale for taxes is the financing of an exogenous stream of government expenditures rather than the manipulation of intertem- 2 A notable exception is the paper by Bagwell and Staiger ð1990Þ, though their focus is on self-enforcing trade agreements.”
- Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data (2014, unknown): “j Mis s ijs s s 1 ijs 'is wi Pjs 1 s jsXj (6)”
- Policy Uncertainty, Trade and Welfare: Theory and Evidence for China and the U.S (2013, unknown): “There is now evidence that countries possess market power and exploit it when they are not in an agreement but less so after an agreement (Broda et al, 2008; Bagwell and Staiger, 2011; Ludema and Mayda, Forthcoming).”
- Global Supply Chains and Trade Policy (2016, background): “…value-added content in foreign production to bilateral tariffs fits into an impor- tant literature documenting that terms-of-trade concerns matter for trade policy formulation [Broda, Limão and Weinstein (2008), Bagwell and Staiger (2011), Ludema and Mayda (2013), Bown and Crowley (2013)].”
- Comparative Advantage and Optimal Trade Policy (2013, methodology): “This rich history is echoed by recent theoretical and empirical work emphasizing the role of termsof-trade manipulation in the analysis of optimal tariffs and its implication for the WTO; see Bagwell and Staiger (1990), Bagwell and Staiger (2011) and Broda et al.”
- Determinants of Global Value Chain Participation: Cross-Country Evidence (2020, unknown): “(2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011) for evidence of this relationship for a sample of pre-WTO accession countries. 30These elasticity estimates are used to study the e¤ect of WTO tari¤ commitments by Bagwell and Staiger (2011) and the general equilibrium impact of trade liberalizations in GTAP mod”
- Openness, Government Size and the Terms of Trade (2009, unknown): “E-mail: gino.gancia@upf.edu 1”
- Is the WTO Passé (2015, unknown): “25 A di¤erent approach to this question is taken by Bagwell and Staiger (2011).”
- Tariff binding and overhang: Theory and evidence (2015, unknown): “Bagwell and Staiger (2011) find evidence that tariff cuts of countries acceding to the WTO are largest in sectors where market power is greatest, which is consistent with the role of trade agreements in neutralizing market power effects.”
- Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements: Evidence from Time-Varying Trade Policy (2010, background): “The earlier empirical literature has examined the cross-sectional variation in a country’s tariff level (Broda, Limão and Weinstein, 2008) or the magnitude of a country’s tariff reduction when moving from a non-cooperative policy to a trade agreement (Bagwell and Staiger, 2011).”
- Do terms-of-trade effects matter for trade agreements? Theory and evidence from WTO Countries* (2013, background): “(5) is satisfied in equilibrium, importers always include all requested goods on their offer lists.”